38 research outputs found
Introduction: Examined Live â An Epistemological Exchange Between Philosophy and Cultural Psychology on Reflection
Besides the general agreement about the human capability of reflection, there is a large area of disagreement and debate about the nature and value of âreflective scrutinyâ and the role of âsecond-order statesâ in everyday life. This problem has been discussed in a vast and heterogeneous literature about topics such as epistemic injustice, epistemic norms, agency, understanding, meta-cognition etc. However, there is not yet any extensive and interdisciplinary work, specifically focused on the topic of the epistemic value of reflection. This volume is one of the first attempts aimed at providing an innovative contribution, an exchange between philosophy, epistemology and psychology about the place and value of reflection in everyday life.
Our goal in the next sections is not to offer an exhaustive overview of recent work on epistemic reflection, nor to mimic all of the contributions made by the chapters in this volume. We will try to highlight some topics that have motivated a new resumption of this field and, with that, drawing on chapters from this volume where relevant.
Two elements defined the scope and content of this volume, on the one hand, the crucial contribution of Ernest Sosa, whose works provide original and thought-provoking contributions to contemporary epistemology in setting a new direction for old dilemmas about the nature and value of knowledge, giving a central place to reflection. On the other hand, the recent developments of cultural psychology, in the version of the âAalborg approachâ, reconsider the object and scope of psychological sciences, stressing that â[h]uman conduct is purposefulâ
Sosa on Knowledge, Judgment and Guessing
In Chapter 3 of Judgment and Agency, Sosa (Judgment and Agency, 2015) explicates the concept of a fully apt performance. In the course of doing so, he draws from illustrative examples of practical performances and applies lessons drawn to the case of cognitive performances, and in particular, to the cognitive performance of judging. Sosaâs examples in the practical sphere are rich and instructive. But there is, I will argue, an interesting disanalogy between the practical and cognitive examples he relies on. Ultimately, I think the source of the disanalogy is a problematic picture of the cognitive performance of guessing and its connection to knowledge and defeat. Once this critical line of argument is advanced, an alternative picture of guessing, qua cognitive performance, is articulated, one which avoids the problems discussed, and yet remains compatible with Sosaâs broader framework
Factive Scientific Understanding Without Accurate Representation
This paper analyzes two ways idealized biological models produce factive scientific
understanding. I then argue that models can provide factive scientific understanding of a
phenomenon without providing an accurate representation of the (difference-making) features of
their real-world target system(s). My analysis of these cases also suggests that the debate over
scientific realism needs to investigate the factive scientific understanding produced by scientistsâ
use of idealized models rather than the accuracy of scientific models themselves
The genealogical method in epistemology
In 1990 Edward Craig published a book called Knowledge and the State of Nature in which he introduced and defended a genealogical approach to epistemology. In recent years Craigâs book has attracted a lot of attention, and his distinctive approach has been put to a wide range of uses including anti-realist metaepistemology, contextualism, relativism, anti-luck virtue epistemology, epistemic injustice, value of knowledge, pragmatism and virtue epistemology. While the number of objections to Craigâs approach has accumulated, there has been no sustained attempt to develop answers to these objections. In this paper we provide answers to seven important objections in the literature
Mind the Gap: Transitions Between Concepts of Information in Varied Domains
The concept of 'information' in five different realms â technological, physical, biological, social and philosophical â is briefly examined. The 'gaps' between these conceptions are disâ cussed, and unifying frameworks of diverse nature, including those of Shannon/Wiener, Landauer, Stonier, Bates and Floridi, are examined. The value of attempting to bridge the gaps, while avoiding shallow analogies, is explained. With information physics gaining general acceptance, and biology gaining the status of an information science, it seems rational to look for links, relationships, analogies and even helpful metaphors between them and the library/information sciences. Prospects for doing so, involving concepts of complexity and emergence, are suggested
Is epistemic expressivism incompatible with inquiry?
Expressivist views of an area of discourse encourage us to ask not about the nature of the relevant kinds of values but rather about the nature of the relevant kind of evaluations. Their answer to the latter question typically claims some interesting disanalogy between those kinds of evaluations and descriptions of the world. It does so in hope of providing traction against naturalism-inspired ontological and epistemological worries threatening more ârealistâ positions. This is a familiar position regarding ethical discourse; however, some authors have recently defended a similar view regarding epistemic discourse. Others have argued that epistemic expressivism faces special problems, not necessarily attaching to expressivism about other areas. Their arguments differ in interesting ways, but the common strategy is an attempt to show that the very sort of meta-epistemological theorizing needed to articulate and establish epistemic expressivism involves the epistemic expressivist in some sort of internal incoherence or self-defeat. That is, they think that articulating or defending the position requires implicit commitment to the negation of one of the positions core tenets. This paper responds to those arguments on behalf of epistemic expressivism, suggesting that they each misunderstand what is crucial to epistemic expressivism. By responding to these arguments, we hope to achieve more clarity about what epistemic expressivism is and why one might want to endorse it in a meta-epistemolog